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 16 China’s relations with Europe
Towards a ‘normal’ relationship?
Chen Zhimin and John Armstrong
During the Cold War era, China’s relations with Europe (or more precisely the European
Union (EU), its predecessor the European Community (EC) and its member states) was
regarded as a ‘signiﬁcant’ but ‘secondary’ relationship, derivative of broader strategic forces
(Yahuda 1994, 268–269). Yet, in the years that have followed the ending of the Cold War,
the international environment has changed considerably, such that China-EU relations can
be argued not only to possess a dynamic of their own, but to have an impact on wider
trends. The ﬁrst decade of the new century witnessed a series of benchmarks—in 2004, for
example, the EU surpassed the USA and Japan, to become China’s biggest foreign trade
partner. In October 2003 China even went so far as to issue an ‘EU Policy Paper’ (FMPRC
2003a), the ﬁrst ever foreign policy paper detailing China’s strategy towards a country or
group of states.
If these events signalled that Europe and the EU had moved towards the ﬁrst rank of
China’s foreign policy horizon, the events that followed subsequently suggest that positive
trends are by no means guaranteed. After the euphoric peak of 2003 and 2004, frictions
and setbacks have become more evident, with disputes over human rights, Tibet, a growing
trade imbalance and the EU’s arms embargo dominating the headlines. China even took the
drastic step of postponing the 11th annual China-EU summit in December 2008 in protest
at French President Sarkozy’s oﬃcial meeting with the Dalai Lama in his capacity as the
rotating President of the European Council. While these trends have not derailed the overall
co-operative relationship, they have sobered expectations about the prospects for and poten-
tial of the ‘strategic partnership’ and have meant that much of the last two years have been
dedicated to repairing rather than driving forward relations.
This chapter will investigate the conceptual, economic, institutional and global aspects of
China’s relations with Europe, focusing on the post-Cold War years, to map out the obstacles
and opportunities that both sides will have to navigate if they are to ensure a mature
partnership of global importance.
Europe in China’s foreign policy thinking
In many ways China’s relationship with Europe is the story of two powers re-emerging, one
through internal economic and social transformation, the other through integration and
intensive policy co-ordination. While the trajectories of both these processes remain uncer-
tain, what is beyond doubt is that their products are both intrinsically linked and critically
important to the future of international relations.
How China foresees the evolution of this relationship depends much on how it perceives
both the EU as an actor in itself and as an actor driven by particular interests. For the most
 part, China’s image of Europe and the EU speciﬁcally has at least until very recently been
overwhelmingly positive. Since China and all the major countries of Western Europe estab-
lished normal diplomatic relationships at the beginning of the 1970s, Europe has been
regarded as a group of countries that have no fundamental conﬂicting interests with China.
This is not to say that there have not been diplomatic skirmishes over human rights, or major
disputes in the early 1990s, such as with France over the export of 60 Mirage-2000 ﬁghter
planes to Taiwan, or with the United Kingdom (UK) concerning the handover of Hong Kong.
The disputes were short-lived, and were properly handled, as the EU countries understand
that the issue of China’s territorial integrity is not something to be contested. Since the UK
withdrew its troops from Hong Kong in 1997, a permanent European military presence in
East Asia from which to project power no longer exists. European countries have no major
geo-strategic interests in East Asia, as the USA does, which would place themselves in conﬂict
with China. Accordingly, the Taiwan issue generally does not feature as a major problem in
EU-China relations As such, China’s 2003 ‘EU Policy Paper’ could proclaim in good faith
that ‘there is no fundamental conﬂict of interest between China and the EU and neither
side poses a threat to the other’ (FMPRC 2003a).
If China does not see the EU as a danger, this is not to say that it is not aware that the
European position on China is far more ambiguous (Zaborowski 2008). Nor does it mean
that it has not viewed its relations with Europe as serving larger strategic objectives. Shortly
after China forged diplomatic normalization with the EC member states, China and the
EC established diplomatic relations in 1975. While these steps were taken out of self-interest
from China’s side, improving relations with Europe and supporting the process of European
integration reﬂected contemporary strategic thinking in China. The ‘Three Worlds’ vision
outlined byMao Zedong, cast the USA and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as
the First World, the major ranking powers, with Western European states belonging to the
Second World, as potential valuable partners in China’s eﬀort to ﬁght the two Cold War hege-
mons. Thus, China encouraged and urged Western European states to integrate themselves
and develop a common stance, independent of the superpowers.
Such a line of thinking continued in the post-Cold War era, with China’s fear that the
lack of any balance to US power in a unipolar world could become the single most threa-
tening force to China’s core interests. An aﬃnity of positions seemed to be emerging, as
European countries deepened their integration process by establishing a common currency
and common foreign and security policy (CFSP)—moves that seemed in part prompted by
concerns over the ‘hyperpower’ of the USA. In that context, Europe is seen as a natural
and ideal partner in China’s drive for a multipolar world (more recently described as a
‘harmonious world’), which places greater stress on multilateralism based on an irresistible
trend towards multipolarization.
Apart from the strategic facets of China’s vision of Europe, since China’s reform and
opening-up policy of the late 1970s, stable relations with Europe have been seen as a necessary
prerequisite for Chinese development. With an export-oriented development strategy, Europe,
with its advanced economy, is seen as providing not just a key market, but also technology
and much-needed investment for China’s massive economic restructuring.
Furthermore, the example of the EU as a successful model of internal and regional trans-
formation is of itself of interest to the Chinese élite. Chinese scholars and policy-makers
have enthusiastically looked upon European initiatives and achievements as something to
draw upon, whether in terms of engineering a sustainable welfare state, ensuring an ecologi-
cally sound mode of development that balances regional disparities, or, perhaps most crucially,
creating a European single market. In simple terms, faced with the tremendous, unfolding
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 challenges that have beset China’s process of rapid economic development, China needs advice,
inspiration and know-how from Europe to help narrow the developmental gap between
coastal and inland regions, to achieve sustainable economic development, to construct a
single domestic economy out of provincial protectionism, and to rebuild its social welfare
system. As China has increasingly involved itself in Asian regional co-operation processes, the
salience of the European integration process as an example (if not a template) for dealing
with interdependence in both greater China and the Asian region as a whole increases.
Overall, the prevailing line of thinking in China was supported by the positive response
from the European side in the form of its policy of ‘constructive engagement’. However, as
later sections will show, more recent developments in bilateral relations and the changing
global context have added new elements to this line of thinking.
Deepening of an interdependent relationship
In 1975, when China and the EC established oﬃcial relations, bilateral trade was only
US $2,400m. With the opening-up of China to global economy, in 1980, China’s trade
with the EC increased to $6,033m. That ﬁgure further increased to $15,925m. in 1990 and
$71,514m. in 2000 (Ash 2008, 224–225). By 2008, total EU-China trade reached $425,600m.,
making the EU China’s biggest trading partner and accounting for 16.6% of China’s total
trade. Conversely, China is the EU’s second largest trade partner after the USA, and its
biggest source of imports. Even in the face of a global economic downturn, the volume of
China’s exports to and imports from the EU in 2008 grew by 19% (NBS 2009).
The EU is also a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI) into China. Over the
last three decades, EU countries’ annual utilized direct investment in China rose from zero
to US $178m. in 1986, to $2,120m. in 1995 and to a peak level of $5,440m. in 2006, with a
share of 7.48% of China’s total FDI in that year (Invest in China 2008). Although invest-
ment from the EU is surpassed by inﬂows from Hong Kong and the British Virgin Islands
(a tax haven that acts as a conduit for investment that originates elsewhere), from 2006, the
EU has invested more than any other major economy. Furthermore, while Asian investors
usually aim to relocate production activities to China in order to take advantage of cheap
labour and land costs, the structure of European investment, like their American counterparts,
tends to bring in bigger, less numerous, higher value-added and high-technology projects,
which produce a ‘catalytic impact’ on China’s development (Barysch, Grant and Leonard
2005, 38).
China’s outward foreign investment into Europe was at a very low level for a long time.
In 2006 China’s total annual outward FDI in the EU was only US$128.7m. However, 2007
witnessed seven-fold growth, with $1,044m. in Chinese investments pouring into EU coun-
tries, with the UK and Germany the favoured destinations; indeed, investment into these
two states accounted for 62% of cumulative Chinese investment into the whole of the EU
by the end of 2007 (MOC 2008, 76). As a result, the EU rose to become the second biggest
destination for China’s outward FDI, surpassed only by Hong Kong. Such a development, if
continued (and all evidence suggests that it will be continued), would create a more balanced
relationship in the ﬁeld of FDI, and could transform the bilateral economic relationship.
Yet, while the relationship is built on trade and economic engagement, it has led to spil-
lover, with a range of co-operation and dialogue in other areas. These span the gamut from
education to space exploration, scientiﬁc innovation to aviation, agriculture to intellectual
property rights. While the inspiration for many can be found in Chinese (e.g., food safety)
and European interests (e.g., intellectual property rights), they ultimately reﬂect China’s
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 ongoing commitment to learn from other models. Not only is this trend likely to continue, it is
also destined to become a two-way process, with Europe learning from Chinese practice and
experimentation. Just as Europe will continue to provide a source of inspiration even in the
context of wavering faith in the Anglo-Saxon model of market governance (China is more
than aware of the range of European models and practices, particularly in areas such as social
welfare reform, economic redistribution and food safety), so China’s eﬀorts to develop its
own brand of multilateral diplomacy, conﬂict resolution and growth and development will
provide alternative strategies and models for action.
Turning to the future, perhaps one of the most crucial areas of co-operation between
China and Europe will be the environment. Here, issues of energy, sustainable development
and protection have provided fertile ground for co-operation, both bilaterally and globally.
The context for co-operation could not be more suitable; few countries are more immedi-
ately faced with the complex trade-oﬀ between economic development and environmental
reform than China, and few more committed to act than Europe. In the context of this enor-
mously complex and interconnected problem, both China and Europe are keen to ensure
that their co-operation becomes a model for others.
Thus far, China has drawn enormously from European practice in terms of environmental
regulation and governance, a trend reﬂected throughout the levels of engagement with Europe,
whether in the form of summit commitments, such as the 2005 declaration on the ﬁght
against climate change, the sectoral dialogues on the environment, energy, and science and
technology, right down to collaborative projects on clean energy. Notwithstanding tensions
in the wake of the December 2009 Copenhagen (Denmark) Summit, when some in Europe
blamed China for the failure to agree binding commitments, these eﬀorts hold the promise
of greater convergence in Chinese and European approaches to climate change over the
longer term.
Codiﬁcation and institutionalization
The widening and deepening of the bilateral relationship has been coupled with a process
of codiﬁcation, through which bilateral co-operation practices are codiﬁed in legal, political
and policy norms. For the most part, this has been achieved through the accumulation of
bilateral agreements, joint statements, unilateral policy papers and eﬀorts to negotiate the
reconﬁguration and streamlining of engagement in the form of an overarching partnership
and co-operation agreement between the EU and China.
In terms of bilateral documents, the most important, as well as the most long-standing, is
the EC-China Agreement on Trade and Economic Co-operation, signed in Brussels, Belgium
in May 1985. This short agreement (containing just 18 articles) was intended to promote
and intensify trade and to encourage the steady expansion of economic co-operation. Given
that most political dialogue between China and EC countries was conducted at the bilateral
level, it should come as no surprise that the EC-China relationship at that time was limited
to economics. Other sector-speciﬁc agreements—for example, the agreement on science and
technology in 2000, the agreement on maritime shipment of 2002 and the co-operation agree-
ment on the Galileo satellite navigation system of 2003—have laid down legal frameworks
for the two sides to work together in the speciﬁc functional areas.
Codiﬁcation also includes the unilateral release of policy documents towards each other
by the two sides. In this regard, the EU is a comparatively more proactive player. In 1995,
after the EU issued its ﬁrst strategy towards Asia, trying to tap into the new economic boom
of East Asian countries, it released its ﬁrst ever policy paper towards China. In ‘A Long
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 Term Policy for China-Europe Relations’ (European Commission 1995), Europe’s relations
with China were presented as a ‘cornerstone’ in Europe’s external relations—not just in Asia,
but globally. In the Commission’s second major China policy paper, of 1998, the long-term
relationship was further updated to a ‘comprehensive partnership’. The paper stressed that,
‘engaging China’s emerging economic and political power, as well as integrating China into
the international community, may prove one of the most important external policy chal-
lenges facing Europe and other partners in the 21st century’ (European Commission 1998, 4).
The EU’s 2003 China policy paper took a further step, proclaiming that ‘the EU and China
have an ever-greater interest to work together as strategic partners to safeguard and promote
sustainable development, peace and stability’ (European Commission 2003, 3). In responding
to the EU’s agenda-setting policy documents, the Chinese government took the unusual
step of issuing its own EU policy paper in October 2003. Detailing China’s vision for the
partnership, this document, taken together with the various policy statements issued by Chi-
nese oﬃcials over the past decade, provides the relationship with substance and aspiration
by which to steer (FMPRC 2003a).
While the previous agreements laid the basic foundations for the EU and China to co-operate
in economic and other individual sectorial areas, and the unilateral policy papers served to
drive the relationship to a higher level, the two sides have not yet provided a comprehensive
bilateral legal framework to guide and regulate the signiﬁcantly broadened relationship. To
adapt to the new stage of this relationship, both sides agreed in September 2006 to launch
negotiations to conclude a single, overarching partnership and co-operation agreement, with
negotiations over the nature of this agreement being formally launched in Beijing in 2007.
In the political and foreign policy areas, a biannual mechanism for dialogue was established
in the early 1980s between political directors of the rotating EU presidency’s ministry
responsible for foreign aﬀairs and the Chinese ambassador to that country. In 1986 the
European Political Cooperation (EPC) Troika at ministerial level started to meet the Chinese
Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs on the margins of the annual UN Assembly (Algieri 2008, 71).
In 1998, with the launching of the ﬁrst EU-China summit, bilateral political dialogue was
further updated to the summit level, and a multilevel mechanism for political dialogue has
been restructured and reinforced since then. In September 2008 the 8th China-EU summit
injected further signiﬁcant impetus into the development of a mechanism for political dialogue
by setting up the regular vice ministerial-level strategic dialogue.
The growing institutionalization of relations has created an expansive network of bureau-
cratic and expert co-operation, dealing with a wide spectrum of bilateral and global issues.
The cumulative eﬀect of these contacts is that relations are no longer simply being driven
by events, a product of reactions trailing in the wake of economic engagement, but have
begun to develop a dynamic of their own.
The rhetoric and reality of ‘strategic partnership’: challenges to the
EU-China relationship
If the increasing institutionalization and codiﬁcation of China-EU relations suggests that both
sides are keen for the relationship to be managed in a more harmonious fashion, this should
not disguise a number of outstanding diﬃculties brought into focus by increased mutual
awareness (of each other’s systems and global strategies) and sensitivity (brought about by
increased interconnection). What the rhetoric of ‘strategic partnership’ encounters in reality
is rhetoric of ‘complicated partnership’, increasingly so from 2005 onwards.
Several factors have contributed to complicate the relationship.
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 First, viewed from the outside attempts to generate a more strategically-oriented EU-China
relationship can easily be interpreted as a joint eﬀort to ‘constrain American power and hege-
mony, whether through the creation of a multipolar world or through multilateral institutional
constraints on the United States’ (Shambaugh 2004, 246).
Symptomatic of this perspective was the US reaction to the EU’s internal debate on the
lifting of the long running arms embargo against China at the end of 2003 during which the
US government made all possible eﬀorts to press the EU’s members to desist (Chen, Z. 2008).
Apprehension that the transfer of military technology might jeopardise US security interests
in Asia blurs easily with the more diﬀuse suspicion that such action might play into a Chinese
strategy of divide and rule, altering the dynamic of relations within and between Western
international society and China (Gompert et al. 2005). Indeed further to this intervention,
the US also sought to establish a transatlantic dialogue mechanism on China. This biannual
dialogue held its ﬁrst meeting in May 2005 in Brussels, with the aim of developing a common
understanding about Asia and China across the Atlantic. Furthermore, as the Bush Adminis-
tration entered its second term, it started to readjust its foreign policy and became more
willing to work with its European allies.
The net eﬀect of this (temporary) improvement in transatlantic relations, has been than
enthusiasm for a more robust EU-China relationship to counter US unilateralism among
Europeans has waned—a trend to some extent mirrored in the continuing pragmatism of
US-Chinese relations.
Shifting to the more immediate, the still booming economic relationship has begun to
experience greater turbulence. This second dynamic has become more visible as the EU’s
trade deﬁcit with China widens. Europeans are becoming aware and concerned about the
challenge presented by China’s economic development, nuancing their previous enthusiasm
for constructive engagement. In October 2006 a new policy paper towards China released
by the European Commission labelled China ‘the central challenge for EU trade policy’
(European Commission 2006, 2). To be sure, there are still beneﬁts for Europe: exports to
China has increased faster than exports to the rest of the world, investment in China has
allowed EU ﬁrms to remain competitive, and imports of China’s low-price goods have kept
inﬂation low in Europe. Nevertheless, complexities across the EU’s economic policies have
given rise to priorities that include further opening the Chinese market, protecting Eur-
opean intellectual property rights, and protecting EU producers from ‘unfair’ competition
from China. As Bates Gill has observed, EU trade policy towards China, though still far from
combative, ‘is somewhat closer to Washington’s approach’ (Gill 2008, 276). This narrowing
of positions has been further signalled by US and European responses to Chinese exchange
rate policy and support for domestic producers in the wake of the 2008 global ﬁnancial
turmoil. While globally orientated Europeans have become impatient with levels of market
access to China, and those more domestically focused have begun to stress the economic
challenge from China, China ﬁnds itself equally frustrated. When China joined the World
Trade Organization (WTO), existing members, including the USA and the EU, insisted
that it remained classiﬁed as a non-market economy (with all the disadvantages that such a
status extends) for a period of 15 years. For example, China’s not having market economy status
gave the EU a freer hand in issuing anti-dumping duties, and in 2007–08 some 42% of all
anti-dumping cases initiated by the EC targeted Chinese producers (Davis 2009). Although
accepting these preconditions, China has come to regard its subsequent treatment as dis-
criminatory, particularly in the light of Russia’s treatment (given that Russia is not a WTO
member) and increasing levels of state intervention in Europe and the USA (Tobias and
Dickie 2004). Inevitably, one of the main thrusts of its foreign policy has been to negotiate
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 for bilateral recognition of its market economy status. There is a strong feeling in China that
Europe neither appreciates the sacriﬁces and progress made to date, nor the degree to which
China as a large economy is actually open. In short, many in China think that, by ‘ignoring
the fact that China is moving towards the market system at a rapid speed’ (Zhou, H. 2000,
220), Europeans are hardly oﬀering encouragement for China to move faster.
Managing the transition towards a ‘normal’ partnership
As the relationship enters into a more complicated and sometimes more problematic phase
that has followed a decade-long (1995–2005) ‘honeymoon’, (Shambaugh, Sandschneider
and Zhou 2008) it is becoming more important that both sides properly manage the tran-
sition towards a mature partnership of equals. Proximity and familiarity test all relation-
ships, and whether they thrive or fail depends on how these problems are communicated
and evaluated.
A series of eﬀorts have been made to cope with the new challenges in EU-China relations.
The negotiations on a new partnership and co-operation agreement were formally laun-
ched in early 2007, aiming to establish a comprehensive legal framework for the relation-
ship in order to provide the ground rules for a mature marriage. In April 2008 European
Commission President José Manuel Barroso led a huge delegation of nine commissioners to
visit China, to convene the ﬁrst annual EU-China High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue.
Although China postponed the Lyon, France EU-China summit of 2008, Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao made an oﬃcial visit to the EU’s Belgian headquarters, Germany, Spain and
the United Kingdom in late January 2009. On April 1 2009, on the periphery of the G20
(Group of Twenty ministers responsible for ﬁnancial aﬀairs and central bank governors)
summit in London, President Sarkozy met his Chinese counterpart, president Hu Jintao,
whereby the two sides formally ended a four-month diplomatic cold war between France
and China.
As bilateral relations return to a normal track, the two sides still have to deal with a number
of challenges if they want to make the most out of this relationship.
First, a more mature relationship depends on both sides developing a better understanding
on the implications of the rise of Europe and China will have on their respective actorness.
Chinese scholars have tended to embrace a rather sophisticated view of the multi-dimensional
EU-China relationship, recognizing the role of a range of European actors—the Commis-
sion, the Council, member states and so on (Zhou and Wu 2004, 20). But a number of
misconceptions remain over the EU’s ability to become a truly global strategic player with a
coherent single European common policy. For example, many in China thought that if Chirac
and Schroeder were willing to lift the arms embargo against China, other member states would
follow—which of course was not the case in the end.
On the European side, Europeans encounter a cognitive problem in comprehending the
pace and scale of China’s rise in recent years. For the alarmists (Freytag 2008), the tradi-
tional view that China represents an economic opportunity to be exploited has begun to be
nuanced and even potentially replaced by the fear that China might challenge European
standing and inﬂuence in global and regional aﬀairs. They seem not well prepared for the
sudden rise of China as a truly global player and unable to develop a long-term strategy to
cope with the rise of China.
Contributing to this complacency seems to be the assumption that China’s economic
development will be accompanied by the parallel process of political liberalization, con-
verging to the European norms of political governance. A belief dissonant with the trend
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 that China’s political system is not converging to European norms, at least to the extent that
some Europeans might have expected, indeed the global ﬁnancial crisis has exposed weak-
nesses in Western systems that if anything validate China’s cautious and selective experi-
mentation, encouraging many in China to be increasingly conﬁdent in the viability of its
own political-economic system—a ‘socialist market-economic system’.
A better mutual understanding requires both sides to see each other for what they are,
(as well as rather than) what they aspire or expect to become. Knowing the limits of the EU
as a strategic actor, it is argued in China that China needs to lower some of its past expecta-
tions about the level and substance of a possible EU-China strategic relationship (Chen,
Z. 2008)—Europe’s inﬂuence in the world comes both from the EU and from its key
member states. The Union, with exclusive trade power delegated by the member states, is
capable of acting as a single actor in international economic aﬀairs. However, in other areas
relevant to global management, such as foreign and security policy, the Union’s institutions
enjoy little room for entrepreneurial activity and can only pursue policies subject to inter-
governmental negotiation and agreement by member states, who are not only willing to
wield their veto powers, but who are also divided on the hard questions of force projection
and global responsibility. This makes common foreign and security policy diﬃcult to develop,
rendering it diﬃcult to perceive the EU (though not necessarily the individual key member
states of Europe) as a potential partner in areas outside UN mandates. The ratiﬁcation of
the Lisbon Treaty should equip the EU with a stronger capacity in foreign policy, by improving
coordination, and forward focused thinking, if not in a revolutionary than at least practical
way. Therefore, in the foreign and security policy area, China has to work with the EU
institutions when there is a common policy, and continue to work with key member states
when a common EU policy is absent.
A counterpart to this reassessment must by an acceptance that Europe needs to deal with
a new China on an equal footing, acknowledging that China’s role is not predetermined.
Indications that this adjustment is already underway amongst Europe’s policy elite came in
the form of the UK government’s most recent policy document on China. In the preface to
the document, the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, in strongly determined words,
emphasized the importance of China, and Britain’s determination to work with China. As
Brown explains, ‘the emergence of China as a global economic and political force is one of the
most signiﬁcant developments of our time. We must work together if we are to deal with the
major challenges we face’ (FCO 2009). Adjustment will also entail Europe adopting a dialogi-
cal approach to how mutual concerns are addressed, and continuing willingness to explore
and expand co-operation beyond the bilateral. This in simple terms means being open to
listening to and learning from Chinese arguments.
Furthermore, Europe has to formulate its China policy based on the convergence of member
states’ long term interests, and make itself a serious actor in its relations with China.
Second, moving beyond the conceptual Europe and China need to rediscover the value of a
healthy EU-China relationship in their respective relations with the USA. Both players have
been keen to improve ties with the USA in anticipation that the Obama Administration,
chastened by the ﬁnancial crisis and burdened by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, can be
encouraged to work in a more multilateral, co-operative manner. The danger is that these
eﬀorts will cause the two players to lose some of the incentives for a stronger bilateral EU-China
relationship, such as the common interest in restraining excessive US unilateralism in the
past. Nevertheless, the improvement in EU-US and Sino-US relationships also makes more
room for better EU-China relations, as the USA might not act as such a strong constraining
factor as before in the development of closer co-operation between the EU and China.
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 An enhanced EU-China relationship would help both sides to strengthen their bargaining
positions vis-à-vis the USA, and rather than inevitably fuelling fears of balancing might even
pave the way for meaningful and eﬀective EU-China-USA trilateral cooperation in issues of
pressing importance, such as reviving the world economy, reforming global ﬁnancial insti-
tutions, ﬁghting against armaments proliferation and climate change.
The third area of adjustment, both Europe and China need to become more pragmatic in
dealing with problems in their bilateral relations. Perhaps the most obvious and immediate
example of such problems is trade and economic co-operation, which has served as the
foundation of this relationship for a long time, but in the context of economic turbulence
can become a new source of tension and division.
Fourth, and a consequence of all the other issues, is that the two sides need to address the issue
of misconceptions about each other. Public support is becoming important on both sides for
a sustained relationship. Viewing the above-mentioned poll results, we can still ﬁnd a generally
positive view about Europe on the Chinese side. Therefore, the bigger perception problem is
on the European side. Over the last decade, the European Commission has worked with China
to support European studies in China by providing €20m. for the EU China Higher Education
Co-operation Programme and the EU-China European Studies Centres Programme. While
these eﬀorts boosted a better understanding of Europe within China, Europe has still not made
serious attempts to enhance its own capacity for modern China studies, to help generate a
better informed policy-making and general public (Shambaugh 2005b). While the Chinese
government has funded the establishment of Confucius Institutes in Europe, as these institutes
still oﬀer mostly only Chinese language courses, it is much needed for the Europeans to
make signiﬁcant investments to foster a strong research and education capacity about con-
temporary China in their universities and think tanks (just as the USA did in the past).
Finally, and perhaps inevitably, the focal points for the China-EU relationship have begun
to multiply, as both actors become more aware and better equipped to exert inﬂuence
beyond their peripheries. For Europe, this has meant adjusting to a new centre of gravity,
working not simply to shape what happens in China, but also working with China in seek-
ing solutions at regional and global level. Correspondingly, for China this means learning
and taking more international responsibility in areas such as preventing proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction, ﬁghting terrorism and climate change, and reforming the global
political and economic regimes.
For example, China and Europe both claim that they are committed to peace, stability
and development on the African continent; both advocate supporting an African model of
sustainable development; and both work hard to practise what they preach with regard to
upholding the peace and stability of African countries and achieving their common devel-
opment goals. While there are plenty of common interests, there is also disagreement on
the methods by which to secure these goals. China favours mediation, gradual reform and,
above all else, removing the economic roots of Africa’s problem, preferences that contrast
with European insistence on conditionality and interference, which often encourage resistance
from African counterparts. Some might fear that a more inﬂuential China might come at
the expense of Europe (Holslag 2008), but such a possibility would only follow from a failure
on the European part to engage.
Conclusions
Europe and China have each secured more signiﬁcant positions in the international system
over the past two decades. Yet, if Cold War bipolarity and the post-Cold War US drive for
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 unipolarity helped forge an ever closer China-Europe relationship, then this sense of clarity
is seemingly lost in the current turbulence of the global political economy. Albeit rhetorically
committed to a ‘strategic partnership’, there is a danger that both actors become internally (or
regionally) absorbed, prioritizing short-terms gains over the better management of interna-
tional society that their participation, collaboration and vision so desperately requires. Nowhere
is this more evident than in the unpleasant encounter between the EU and China at the
December 2009 Copenhagen climate conference where expectations for a more ambitious
gloabal compact to combat climate change were so publically misaligned.
What this means is that Europe and China have to readjust themselves to a new relation-
ship between a rapidly increasing state power in China, and the collective power of the EU,
which is still primarily focused upon its capacity to attract new member states and foster
internal integration. Failure to do so, choosing the course of hesitation, waiting until deﬁ-
nitive proof of what kind of political animals China and Europe are destined to become, invites
doubt, mistrust and disharmony between two powers whose relationship will either strengthen
or undermine world peace and prosperity. The two sides also need to adapt to the more
mature, multilevel, multidimensional and multifaceted relationship, which demands ever
more careful management and political guidance than before.
Indeed, complexity is what a mature, ‘normal’ relationship is all about. It is therefore impor-
tant to resist the temptation to parcel the relationship into simplistic dichotomies that place
the future trajectory of relations neatly into a box; dichotomizing (partner vs. competitor;
ally vs. rival; winner vs. loser) is simply unhelpful. To navigate through this complexity, the
two sides need to make use of existing institutions to manage wisely (and not just shelve)
their diﬀerences, while seeking to deﬁne and broaden areas of co-operation. China has to make
clearer to itself what position Europe occupies within its overall foreign policy strategy, to
resist the temptation to drift with events or become blinkered by the idea of ‘Chimerica’
(Ferguson 2008), or to act as an ambiguously qualiﬁed spokesman for developing countries.
On the European side, it is of the utmost urgency that European countries jointly formulate
a consensus on a long-term China policy, to diﬀuse the fear on the Chinese side that the com-
plexity of EU policy-making processes will lead to lowest common denominator positions that
will not only slow down the pace of Sino-EU co-operation but prevent meaningful foreign
and security co-operation. In that sense, the ratiﬁcation of the Lisbon Treaty should be con-
ducive towards the possibility of servicing a mature and substantive ‘strategic partnership’—
and both sides can invest in the providence and skills of those taking up the positions of the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀairs and Security Policy or President of
the European Council, thereby encouraging the Union to reinforce its newly emerging
foreign service and building on points of common interest to create a more kinetic, or
action-orientated partnership.
China’s relations with Europe: towards a ‘normal’ relationship? 165
